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THE DORMANT INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE: UP IN
SMOKE?
Richard D. Agnew*
Probably the most important of these powers granted to Congress
was the so-called 'Commerce Power' which provided that Congress
should have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and the several states ....
- Chief Justice William Rehnquist on the
express grants of authority in the Constitution.!
I. Introduction
In 1975 Justice William Rehnquist performed a skit at a Christmas party
that rubbed Chief Justice Warren Burger the wrong way.' As the next case
assignments were handed out, Chief Justice Burger gave Justice Rehnquist only
one case, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation? The case was a Montana Indian tax dispute which Rehnquist
interpreted as a statement of Chief Justice Burger's displeasure with him
With this case, Justice Rehnquist arguably weakened the Indian Commerce
Clause to such a point that he found its exclusion from the Commerce Clause
permissible when citing to the Constitution. Arguably, the issue resurfaces in
the Court's language in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,5 possibly making the issue
ripe for the Court's review. The thesis of this note is whether Seminole Tribe
v. Florida6 breathes new life into the question of the possible existence of a
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause.
This note will discuss the issue at hand in three main points and lesser sub-
points. Part II will discuss the history of the Commerce Clause. In this section,
a discussion of the history of the clause, the ground mark cases and its
application will be provided. Also addressed in part ]I will be the section of
the Commerce Clause that directly applies to the Indians. Finally, part II will
focus on the Dormant Commerce Clause. An explanation of the working of the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the historically significant cases will be
*Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. WiUAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 116 (1987).
2. Michael Minnis, Judicially-Suggested Harassment of Indian Tribes: The Potawatomis
Revisit Moe and Colville, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 289 (1991).
3. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
4. Minnis, supra note 2, at 289.
5. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. Id. at 62-63.
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covered. Part I[I will focus on the history of the argument surrounding the
possibility of the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause. Case law pertaining to
the issue will be discussed. Finally, part IV will give possible outcomes of
important cases that may be affected by the decision of the issue.
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colvile Indian Reservation,7 wrote that there were
two discussed tribal concerns. The first was a policy of encouraged tribal self-
government 8 The second was a strong interest in stimulating Indian economic
and commercial development.' To demonstrate the federal emphasis of these
two issues, he cited the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934."0 Additionally, he
cited the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act and the
Indian Financing Act." Lost among this federal language and discourse of
self-government and encouraged economic development are the startling
statistics showing that the Indian tribes are on a continual losing streak in the
Supreme Court. 2 The bulk of the cases that presently reaches the federal
courts and involves the tribes' and the states' focuses on the issue of the states'
range of power inside the Indian reservation." Examples of these statistics
show that from the late 1950's to the middle of the 1980's the tribes enjoyed
a success rate of greater than sixty percent while arguing in front of the
Supreme Court."' From the middle 1980's to the 1990's, the success rate fell
to twenty percent. 5 At the beginning of the 1990's, the tribes' success rate in
the Supreme Court had fallen to a paltry fourteen percent. 6 This widening
gap between the purported federal concerns for the tribes by Congress and the
seemingly judicial destruction of the tribes by the Court is on a path of
devastation with the tribes being the silent victim of the fall out. With its
decision in the Seminole Tribe,7 the Court has provided itself a perfect
opportunity to revisit the issue of the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause. The
Court's decision on this issue will lend great foresight to the continuing battle
of economic development for the tribes.
7. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
8. Id. at 155.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,
1057 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-63 (1996).
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NOTES
II. The Commerce Clause
Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes".' Black's Law
Dictionary defines commerce as the exchange of goods, productions, or
property of any kind or the buying, selling, and exchanging of articles.'9
Following the Revolutionary War, the nation became economically bogged
down due to a lack of consensus among the states regarding the flow of
interstate commerce." Exercising their sovereignty over commerce, each state
supervised interstate commerce in a different way - most attempting to gain
a competitive advantage over the others.2' The states were so fearful of trade
restrictions and a strong national government that when they formed a new
national government under the Articles of Confederation they intentionally left
the power to regulate commerce to the new states.' The Articles of
Confederation provided that no federal treaties could limit an individual state's
powers over commerce and the taxation of imports and exports. States began
to impose trade barriers with other states which touched off a battle that almost
destroyed interstate trade among themselves. Some leaders also thought that
without some economic regulation the nation would fail Mounting problems
regarding interstate commerce, most often manifesting themselves in the form
of tariffs, were one of the driving forces behind the drafting of the
Constitution.: Several states voiced concern about granting Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce. ' Because of this concern and debate
regarding how wide the grant of power to Congress should be interpreted in
matters involving state regulation of commerce, the legislative history is blurred
and lacks any direction that the Court can follow.' Two common themes
emerge in relation to the Commerce Clause. First, the clause must have been
intended to stop the destructive practices of the individual states in regards to
tariffs and trade barriers.u Second, the Commerce Clause must have intended
to grant Congress enough power to deal with the economic problems of the
nation as a whole, unlike the Articles of Confederation which left it to the
individual states'
18. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (6th ed. 1990).
20. CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 340 (6th ed. 1996).
21. It.
22. ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 1.
23. Id.
24. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 137 (4th ed. 1991).
25. DUCAT, supra note 20, at 340.
26. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 137.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The process of judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause began in
1824 with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden."
Remembering the economic nightmare that plagued the nation before the
signing of the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall took the opportunity to set
precedent in regards to the new power of the Congress over interstate
commerce.3 The case presented the Court an opportunity to address the
question about the scope of power that Congress had when it came to
geographical areas that had traditionally been viewed as falling within the
states' police power?2 The case involved New York State granting a
monopoly to a private company to conduct steamboat navigation in the waters
of New York. When a competitor came and began to provide service in the
waters of New York, he was sued for encroachment on the monopoly and was
defended on the grounds that the state granted monopoly violated the
Commerce Clause. Marshall found that the monopoly conflicted with a valid
federal statute dealing with the licensing of ships, and as such the monopoly
violated the Supremacy Clause.33 In his opinion, Marshall broadly interpreted
the view of commerce and Congress' power to regulate it. Moreover, he
defined commerce as "intercourse that extended into each state".' Interpreting
the phrase "among the several states" to mean commerce that concerns more
than one state,35 Marshall allowed that the internal commerce of a state was
not within the scope of federal government regulation.6 However, Marshall
concluded that the federal power extended to commerce which concerned more
than one state. Regardless of the location of the commerce within the state, the
power of Congress may be exercised.37
From 1888 to 1936, many different decisions and theories formed the idea
of federal regulation of commerce and internal activities of the state. The first
of these theories was the concept of dual federalism.' Using the Tenth
Amendment to define the limits of the powers of Congress, the theory of dual
federalism required a direct connection to interstate commerce in order to place
it under the federal power?9 The period of dual federalism was marked by
cases such as Kidd v. Pearsone4 where the Court held that an Iowa statute
could regulate activity if classified as manufacturing rather than commerce.4'
30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
31. DUCAT, supra note 20, at 340.
32. Id.
33. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 20.
34. Id. at 189.
35. Id. at 194.
36. Id. at 195.
37. Id.
38. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 143.
39. Id.
40. 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
41. Id at 20.
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The Court began to lighten its stand on dual federalism and the Tenth
Amendment by backing away from the requiring a direct connection to
interstate commerce for federal regulation.4 The Court's shift began to allow
regulation if it was within the stream or current of commerce.43 The theory
of commerce regulation took form in the Swift & Co. v. United States"
decision. In this case, the Court viewed the sale of beef at stockyards as a
component of the current of commerce among the states, and as such no one
state could regulate it.4 The theory of regulating commerce in the stream or
current of intrastate commerce allowed the federal government to regulate an
intrastate activity if the activity is sufficiently connected with interstate
activity.' A case that established one of the most lenient theories of the day
in regards to the power of Congress and the regulation of commerce is found
at the case of Houston, E. & W. Texas Railway Co. v. United States,47 also
known as the Shreveport Rate Case. In this action, the Court looked to the
substantial economic effect of the product being regulated.48 The Court
concluded that it did not matter if the regulated activity was totally intrastate
commerce if the ultimate objective was the protection of interstate
commerce.'
In the early to mid-1930's with the nation's economy in distress, radical
legislation dubbed the New Deal was passed in hopes of pulling the country
out of the economic basement. Before this time, the Congress and the Supreme
Court were unsure as to the extent of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. Evidenced by the few cases previously discussed, the Court had
reached no solid conclusion about Congress's power to regulate commerce.
Attempting to help the nation out of economic hard times, President Franklin
Roosevelt signed the National Industrial Recovery Act. Subsequently, the
question of its constitutionality reached the Court in the Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States' case. The Court struck the act down finding that the
regulation was an application that intruded into the domain of interstate
commerce.5' In the case, the Court established that federal regulation of
commerce would only be tolerated in instances where a direct effect as
opposed to an indirect effect on the stream of commerce could be found.52
The Court in this case and in subsequent decisions began to hold that direct
42. Ud
43. Id.
44. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
45. Id. at 398-99.
46. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 143.
47. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
48. Id. at 351.
49. Id. at 356.
50. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
51. DUcAT, supra note 20, at 378.
52. Id.
No. 2] NOTES
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effects on the stream of commerce came from activities that dealt with
distribution." Further, these areas of direct effect dealing with distribution
may have fallen within the scope of federal regulation. The Court also
concluded that indirect effects were tied to activities that dealt with production
and as such were outside the scope of federal regulation.' The tone of the
Court with its holdings requiring the federal regulation of commerce to have
a direct or logical relationship with commerce placed a large part of the New
Deal legislation on the shelf." Because of the Court's treatment of the New
Deal legislation in 1937, President Roosevelt attempted to pass legislation that
would allow him to "pack" the federal courts with judges of his choosing.'
In 1937 the Court, heeding Chief Justice Marshall's advice, began to defer to
other branches of the government in matters of economics and social
welfare.' The question as to what initiated the reform of the Justices is still
argued." Some think it was pressure from Roosevelt and his court packing
plan, while others think it was the Justices recognizing the worsening economic
state of the nation." Regardless of the reason behind the Court's change of
stance concerning federal regulation and the Commerce Clause, these decisions
and events ushered the Court into its present treatment of federal commerce
legislation.'
Today the Supreme Court views the Commerce Clause as a complete grant
of independent power to the federal government. It has done away with the
direct and indirect or production/distribution distinctions in determining the
federal government's scope of power.6 ' The Court has turned back to Justice
Marshall's idea of commerce among the states as commerce that involves more
than one state.' The Court is more prone to defer to the legislature's choices
and uphold a law if there is a rational basis to be found between the regulation
and the commerce.' An item, person, or activity may fall under the modem
commerce power of Congress in three different ways.' The three modem
tests of the court are as follows. First, the federal government may regulate
any interstate commerce if the law does not run against any specific
constitutional guarantee.' Second, the federal government may regulate the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 153.
56. Id
57. Id. at 154.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. Id
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activity of a single state if a close and substantial relationship to or effect on
commerce and the regulation is established, even if it is based on theoretical
economic impact or relationship.' Finally, the federal government may
regulate state to state activities regardless of the effect on commerce as long
as the regulation is necessary and proper to the regulation of commerce
Today the Court allows the Tenth Amendment argument of state rights in
limited situations." The Court will void a federal statute if it finds that the
statute governs the state as states, regulates attributes of state sovereignty, and
directly impairs the state's ability to structure traditional state functions.w
The federal Constitution refers to the Indian tribes twice in its body.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "representatives shall be
apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each state, and excluding Indians not
taxed."'" This reference to the Indian tribes may suggest that the framers of
the Constitution considered that some of the Indian tribes would not be part of
the general population of the states." Moreover, the Indian tribes would not
be subject to the state's jurisdiction." The second reference to the Indian
tribes in the Constitution is the direct reference made to the Indians and the
regulation of trade with them in the Commerce Clause.74 To better understand
the history behind the reference to the Indians in the Commerce Clause, it will
be helpful to have a brief explanation of the relationship of the tribes to the
federal government as a whole. The word "tribe" used in the Commerce Clause
refers to a self-governing body." Native American peoples not organized into
a recognized form of tribal government are not within the reach of the federal
commerce regulation' From this, it becomes apparent that the Commerce
Clause refers to a regulation of Indian commerce and not the Indian people
themselves." The relationship that the federal government and the tribes share
is unique unto the two parties." The tribes live and exist in a territory over
which the federal government holds sovereignty.' The tribes, like a foreign
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. E. PARMALEE PRENTIcE & JOHN G. EAGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 365 (1898).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
72. PRENTICE & EAGAN, supra note 70, at 340.
73. 1d.
74. Id.
75. WILLIAM DRAPER LEwis, FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE AND ITS EFFECT ON STATE
AcTON 21 (1892).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 22.
79. Id.
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nation, have attempted to remain independent from the federal government
establishing their own laws and distinct governments.' The relationship
between the federal government and the tribes is one of guardian and ward
respectively.
This relationship did not form overnight, but took form from a line of Court
decisions which were coined the Cherokee Cases. In 1831, the state of Georgia
attempted to invoke its laws upon the native Cherokee Indians."' The Treaty
of Houston, made between the President of the United States and
representatives of the tribe, established the boundaries for the Cherokee
Nation.' Georgia passed legislation placing the Indian nation under the
control of the state making it against the law to follow Cherokee law." As a
result of this legislation, the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgiau was
brought in which the tribe argued that it was not subject to the laws of Georgia
because they are akin to a foreign nation.' The Supreme Court dismissed the
action stating that the Court had no jurisdiction because the tribe was not a
foreign nation within the meaning of article Il, section 2.6 The holding
determined that the tribe was not a foreign nation. In his opinion Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the tribes though not foreign nations are more akin to a
domestic dependent nation." Marshall stated that the relationship is one of
guardian and ward, the tribes look to the federal government for protection,
kindness, and power.u Chief Justice Marshall opined that the Indian tribe
cannot be a foreign nation as defined by the Constitution." Stating that a
foreign nation unlike the Indian nations is one that possesses complete
independence of another as to ownership of territory.' The Indian tribes are
not sole owners of their territory, but are subject to the federal government's
ownership of the land.9 The Court found the Georgia law null and void. One
year later, a young missionary was arrested for being in Indian country. He
was in violation of a statute that required a white person to acquire a license
to enter Indian country. In the case of Worcester v. Georgia the young
missionary brought a habeas corpus case against the state claiming that the law
of Georgia did not apply in Indian country. 3 Chief Justice Marshall writing
80. Id. at 22-23.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
85. Id. at 15.
86. Id. at 19-20.
87. Id. at 17.
88. Id.
89. LEWIS, supra note 75, at 24-25.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
93. Id. at 537-38.
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for the Court concluded that the laws of Georgia cannot apply inside Indian
country without contradicting the Trade and Intercourse Act and the Treaty of
Hopewell." In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall specifically made reference
to article 9 of the Treaty of Hopewell, which states as follows.
For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention
of injuries or oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the
United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and
exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and
managing all their affairs as they think proper.95
Marshall explained the reference to "all their affairs" in the treaty stating
that it is not a surrender of rights by the tribes, but instead a surrendering of
authority in regulating trade with the Indian tribes to the federal government."
The Court concluded that the Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political
communities" who rely on the federal government for protection and aid, but
that still remain a distinct sovereign nation not subject to the laws of
Georgia 7 Regarding this landmark decision, the incumbent President Jackson
was supposedly quoted as stating "Marshall has made his decision, now let him
impose it."'" Finally in 1886 in the case of United States v. Kagama,? the
constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act came before the Court." In the
opinion of the Court, Justice Miller upheld the federal jurisdiction over two
Native Americans who committed a murder in Indian country on the grounds
that Indian tribes are wards of the nation, communities dependent on the United
States.'' In the holding of the case, this potent language was used to describe
the relationship between the tribes and the federal government. "From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."" Though
derogatory and demeaning in nature, this passage of language is perhaps one
of the strongest examples of the relationship that exists between the tribes and
the federal government. This statement established the federal government's
duty to protect the Indian tribes. The federal government acting as a trustee for
the tribes has a fiduciary duty to ensure and protect the tribes. This relationship
has not substantially changed over time between the federal government and
94. Id. at 561-62.
95. Id. at 553.
96. Id. at 553-54.
97. Id. at 561.
98. HORACE GREELEY, AMERICAN CONFLICr 106 (1864).
99. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
100. Id. at 376.
101. Id. at 384.
102. Id.
No. 2] NOTES
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the tribes with each still exercising their part in the guardian and ward
relationship.
Understanding the special relationship between the tribes and the federal
government helps in understanding the purpose of the direct reference to the
Indian tribes in the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The
history behind the inclusion of the Indian tribes into the Commerce Clause is
arguably uneventful in comparison to other hotly debated inclusions to the
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention. Before the decision to form a
new Constitution and the Constitutional Convention, our young nation followed
the Articles of Confederation. The precursor to the Indian Commerce Clause
may be found in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation. Article IX gave
the Continental Congress under the Confederation the sole and exclusive rights
and power to regulate trade and manage all affairs with the Indians, not
members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any state
within its own limits be not infringed or violated."° Under the Articles, the
states and Congress struggled over the rights and powers of each in relation to
the control of commerce with the Indians. Some states attempted to apply the
Article so broadly as to claim that the legislative rights of the state allowed
them control over all Indian affairs inside the boundary of the state. From this
broad reading of the Article, the states felt that allowing the federal government
to control Indian affairs would be a breach of the state's own sovereignty."
In the twilight of the Articles of Confederation, many of the great leaders of
the states began to voice displeasure with the state of the government in the
form of published papers, collectively known as the Federalist Papers. The
Federalist Papers were essays that provided the backdrop from which the new
Constitution was drafted. Writing in the Federalist No. 42l" from the New
York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788, James Madison addressed the
problems with the Articles of Confederation and Article IX. Madison wrote
that the regulation of commerce with the Indians in the Articles was obscure
and contradictory." Commenting on the state's claim of legislative right to
regulation of Indian trade Madison wrote,
And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State,
yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by
an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights
of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only
case in which the Articles of Confederation have inconsiderately
endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial
sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States;
103. Clinton, supra note 12, at 1103.
104. ld.
105. THE FEDERAUST No. 42 (James Madison).
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 275 (James Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1937).
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to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting
the whole remain.'"
With the nation in straits over the regulation of commerce, the
Constitutional Convention convened in hopes of instituting a method of
government that would cure the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation.
At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison was the pioneer of the Indian
Commerce Clause, bringing the issue to the floor and ensuring its inclusion in
the final draft of the federal Constitution. From James Madison's diary of the
debates put into print form by Jonathan Elliot under the title Elliot's Debates
on the Federal Constitution, the debates relating to the Indians may be traced.
In committee on Tuesday, June 19, 1787, Madison while considering a
proposed plan of federal government by William Patterson raised the question
of the federal government's authority to prevent encroachments upon federal
authority."0 ' To provide an example of the type of encroachment, Madison
drew upon the supposed authority of the federal government to solely deal with
the Indians, an authority that had been repetitively abridged by the states.'
From Madison's comment it became apparent that he felt it is the federal
government's role to deal with the Indian tribes and that any new plan of
federal government must protect against the encroachment of the states upon
this duty. In convention on Saturday, August 18, 1787, Madison submitted to
the committee of detail several powers as proper to be added to those of the
general legislature. The third of the powers submitted was a delegation of
power "to regulate affairs with the Indians, as well within as without the limits
of the United States"." This submission to the committee of detail marks the
textual beginning of the Indian Commerce Clause. In convention on
Wednesday, August 22, 1787, the committee of detail reported on the
submissions of Madison with the suggestion of changing the clause to read
"and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the laws
thereof."'. The new submission by the detail committee made a definite
statement as to the federal power of control over Indians living inside the
boundary of any state. The submission also alluded to the distinction between
the recognized tribes who are properly regulated by the federal government's
scope of authority and those not subject to the laws of the states. In convention
on Tuesday, September 4, 1787, the gentleman from New Jersey, David
Brearly, reported from committee that the addition of "and with the Indian
Tribes" should be added prior to the report going before the convention."'
107. Id4
108. JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 207
(1845).
109. d. at 208.
110. Id. at 439.
111. Id. at 462.
112. Id. at 506-07.
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This marked the last submission for alteration by committee on the proposed
language concerning the Indian Commerce Clause. In convention on Monday,
September 17, 1787 the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin,
addressed the convention with his words of guidance in regard to the signing
and submission of the Constitution to the President. After minor statements by
other delegates concerning the submission of the Constitution, the delegates
signed the final draft of the Constitution to be submitted to the President for
his approval. In the final draft, the present Commerce Clause took its present
form reading "the Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."".
After the ratification of the Constitution and the establishment of the federal
government's right to regulate Indian commerce, the next logical question
would be what constitutes Indian commerce. In the concurring opinion of
Worcester v. Georgia,"' Justice Washington stated that commercial regulation
has been referred to as the basis of jurisdiction over intercourse that has no
commercial nature and which no transportation has occurred."5 The power
to regulate commerce has been regarded as including a sale wholly within a
state, and without reference to transportation. Such commerce regulation is
validated under the broad term "intercourse"." 6 Regardless, the commerce
alluded to in the Indian Commerce Clause cannot be without some commercial
character."' Like commerce with foreign nations and the separate states,
Indian commerce is such that there are certain criteria necessary to qualify the
commerce as that which is under the scope of the federal government."' The
difference between the Indian commerce, foreign commerce, state commerce
concerning its regulation by the federal government lies in the relationship
between the tribe and the government. The special relationship between the
tribes and the federal government mandates that the power over the commerce
of the Indian tribes is stronger than that with foreign nations."' It is not
important that the Indian tribes reside within the boundary of a state for
Congress to regulate their commerce." In fact, the power of Congress to
regulate the Indian commerce is no less powerful than that which it exercises
over the state.' One of the principle purposes of Congress regulating Indian
113. Id. at 560.
114. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 569 (1832) (Washington, J., concurring).
115. PRENTICE & EAGAN, supra note 70, at 341.
116. FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 62-63
(1908).
117. PRENTICE & EAGAN, supra note 70, at 341.
118. 1& at 342.
119. Id.
120. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 69 (1898).
121. THOMAS H. CALVERT, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REGULATION OF COMMERCE
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 9 (1907).
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commerce is to protect tribal members from fraud and injustice by the white
man. " Another is to protect the frontiersman from native insurrection on the
great frontier." The relationship between the federal government and the
tribes requires there to be a greater power concerning the regulation of
commerce with the tribes, a power that is possibly greater than any would be
over any other branch of regulated commerce. The definition of commerce has
broad parameters as it pertains to the tribes in the Commerce Clause. The
federal government's regulatory power deals not only with commerce and the
regulation of traffic in commodities, but to all commercial intercourse with the
tribes and over all those involved in the transactions."u The federal
government's control over any commerce with the Indian tribes is so
comprehensive in scope that it is possible for the government to enforce a total
prohibition of Indian commerce."
The federal government's ability to regulate commerce is an issue that has
not gone unquestioned, even though it falls under a specific grant of the power
in the Constitution. If a state statute of commerce regulation and a federal
statue of commerce regulation come into conflict, the federal statute will trump
the state regulation by way of the Supremacy Clause." States have the right
to regulate the health, morals, and well-being of its citizens, but these
regulations may be limited by constitutional grants of power such as the
Commerce Clause. The question that has surrounded the Commerce Clause
and the federal government's right to regulate commerce is a question of the
breadth of the clause and its appropriateness when Congress has not spoken
concerning a regulation. The Constitution does not give an explanation
regarding the extent of the federal government's power, or to what extent a
state and a federal regulation will be allowed to coexist without any
congressional grant of the power to the state.2 When confronted with the
constitutionality of this issue, some Justices sitting on the Supreme Court have
stated that the Commerce Clause is not more than a grant of power to the
Congress and not to the Court." Regardless of the Justices' individual
opinions, the Court consistently held that a state may not interrupt the flow of
commerce. The Court emphasized that a state may not pass regulations in the
name of its police powers if the regulation will unduly burden the flow of
commerce." This judicially created theory is known as the Dormant
Commerce Clause or the Negative Commerce Clause and allows the court to
determine the effect of state regulation on commerce where Congress has
122. PRENTICE & EAGAN, supra note 70, at 342.
123. Id.
124. 1L at 345.
125. LEWIS, supra note 75, at 29-30.
126. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 274.
127. Id.
128. DUCAT, supra note 20, at 465.
129. Id.
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remained silent. When the Court decides the allowable limits of a state
regulation about which the federal government had remained silent, it is in
effect attempting to interpret the silence of Congress concerning the state
regulation.' There is a safety valve on the process of the Court deciding
issues that some may feel are better left to Congress. The safety check is the
legislature's ability to propose legislation that would align the Court's ruling and
Congress's intentions, if the Court's decision is inconsistent with the goal of
Congress."' The early Court truly struggled with the dilemma of state
regulation of commerce in the absence of congressional guidance. Faced with
deciding what the legislature would do regarding commerce regulation, the
Court in actuality would be determining a national economic policy in the
absence of Congress's guidance. The Court has attempted to follow the
groundwork of the framers of the Constitution and their reasoning for adopting
the Commerce Clause. The framers and the Court in turn have attempted to
interpret the Commerce Clause as a guard against internal trade barriers and
to attempt to foster a free and open market common to all states and
competitors.'33 With this as a guide, the Court formed a framework that
allows the state to regulate some areas of commerce."M In the same manner,
the Court decided that it should sometimes interpret Congress's silence as an
indication that the area may not be regulated at all by the state.3 ' State
regulatory legislation determined to be discriminatory and that may cause
another state to retaliate with its own regulation is against the goal of a free
market under the Commerce Clause and will be determined to be outside the
bounds of the Dormant Commerce Clause."
Early case law that aided the Court in forming its view of the Dormant
Commerce Clause may be traced back to two main decisions from the 1700's.
Gibbons v. Ogden3' was the first of two early decisions to reach the court
with the issue of congressional silence and state regulation. In this case, the
state of New York granted individuals exclusive steamboat licenses to operate
in the waters of New York. A steamboat operator who had been denied a
license challenged the state for granting a monopoly license to a single
operator. The defendant claimed that granting licenses to some but not all was
a violation of the federal commerce power. The Court considered the question
of whether the commerce power of the federal government is exclusive or
concurrent.'3' The Court broadly defined commerce as not only buying and
130. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 274.
131. Id. at 275.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 276.
137. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
138. Id. at 100.
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selling but also all commercial intercourse. Moreover, Congress could regulate
all commerce that involved more than one state.'39 Chief Justice Marshall
writing for the Court conceded that there was "great force" in the argument
posed by the defendant's council arguing that the power of Congress over
commerce was exclusive.'" Despite this argument for exclusion, Chief Justice
Marshall found no reason to decide the issue. Finding that the state regulation
conflicted with a congressional act, Marshall pointed out that the Supremacy
Clause pre-empted the state regulation.4 ' In the opinion, Marshall assumed
that the state could regulate commerce if it did not conflict with a
congressional act.' In 1851 the Court again faced the issue of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens.43 Cooley is
seen as a culmination of the Court's early search for a proper method of
judicial review of state commerce regulation in the absence of congressional
guidance.'" In Cooley, a Pennsylvania law required ships navigating
Philadelphia's waters to employ a pilot for navigational reasons. While it
required ships to hire local pilots, the statute also required fee payment for
those ships that failed to comply with the statute. The Board of Wardens sued
Cooley for failing to comply with the statute by not hiring local pilots. Cooley
argued that the statute was a tax on commerce rather than a regulation
pertaining to pilots. Congress had earlier passed an act that dealt with
navigation and piloting. The Court began by building upon the assumption that
the law was a regulation of interstate commerce, but that the regulation of
commerce was a concurrent power.45 Articulating this idea by finding a
difference between those regulations that are required to be uniform throughout
the country and those that permit variance of treatment in order to fulfill local
needs, the Court sustained the statute.'" The Court formed what is described
as a "doctrine of selective exclusiveness," better known as the Cooley Doctrine,
which allowed the Court to look at the subject of the regulation before
determining the properness of the regulation.4 ' Declaring that the question
about whether or not Congress's power over commerce was exclusive was
misguided in that it lost sight of the nature of the subjects of the regulation."
The Court laid out the groundwork of the Cooley Doctrine in the following
statement, "whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to
139. Id. at 193-94.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 129.
142. Id. at 60.
143. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
144. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 279.
145. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318.
146. Id. at 327.
147. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 240.
148. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 328.
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be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."14" This
decision and the Cooley Doctrine were used by the Court for nearly 100 years
in cases that dealt with the Dormant Commerce Clause.' The rational
behind the decision and the doctrine itself were not without flaws. The decision
did not provide any indication as to what would constitute a national product
that required uniform regulation and a local item that could be regulated by the
state.'' Furthermore, it is debatable that the Court's probe into a questionable
matter could be limited to the subject matter alone."n It is unlikely that the
Court would not examine the nature and the effect of the regulation when
determining its validity.'53 Without investigating the regulations surrounding
circumstances, a state could feasibly discriminate against a neighbor state under
the guise of a local regulation." With this in mind, the history of the Court's
decisions shows that the Court is more likely to allow a local regulation which
is neutral in its application of the burden upon the states residents as well as
residents from separate states. 55
The modem treatment of the Dormant Commerce Clause is one that focuses
on the balancing of interests between the federal government and those of the
police powers of the separate states. The modem balancing test now used by
the Court to decide Dormant Commerce Clause questions came about in the
1970 decision of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.56
In Pike the appellant, a grower of high quality cantaloupes, brought the
action against the official charged with the enforcement of a state fruit and
vegetable standardization act claiming that the act was unconstitutional. "
The appellant brought the action to enjoin an order that had been filed against
him for transporting uncrated cantaloupes from his ranch to a nearby out of
state city for packaging and processing.' The order filed by the state official
would have forced the appellant to construct facilities to package the
cantaloupes at a cost that would be greater than the worth of the cantaloupes
themselves."5 9 The issue before the Court was whether the order that would
compel the grower to construct the packaging facility was unconstitutional by
imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce." ° The Court allowed that
the methods used to determine the validity of a state statute and its effects on
149. Id.
150. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 279.
151. Id. at 280.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
157. Id. at 141.
158. d.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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interstate commerce had been stated many different ways in the past.16" ' In
hope of establishing one universal test, the Court in Pike lays out the general
rule in what has become known as the Pike Balancing Test.
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a local legitimate purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. The extent of the burden
would depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.'"
Applying the test, the Court determined that the act was passed not in
response to a health concern but rather to protect the state fruit growers
reputations against deceptive packaging.1" The Court found that the purpose
and design of the act as a protection of reputation was a constitutional interest
that the state had a legitimate right to protect.'" In the present case, the
grower was punished for not placing the name of the state on his superior
product." The reputation of the growers was not being jeopardized, but in
fact the state attempted to capitalize from the name of the superior grower by
requiring him to package and use the state name." The Court determined
that although valid on its face, the compelling state interest of the reputation
of the growers was not as great as the burden upon commerce that would be
created by requiring the appellant to construct a packaging facility in the
state.' 6
The new Pike Balancing Test laid to rest the prior test used by the Court,
which focused on the direct and indirect effect on commerce in order to
determine the validity of a regulation. For a state regulation to pass
constitutional mustard, it must meet each of the following requirements. First,
the state regulation must pursue a legitimate state end. Second, the state
regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate end. Lastly, the
regulatory burden imposed by the state on interstate commerce, and any
discrimination against interstate commerce, must be outweighed by the state's
interest in enforcing its regulation." The first prong of the test deals with the
meaning of legitimate state ends. The Court distinguishes between regulations
161. Id. at 142.
162., Id.
163. ld. at 143.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 144.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 146.
168. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUIYONAL LAW § 6.5, at 408 (1988).
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that promote the health and safety of the state and those that provide an unfair
economic advantage.69 If the Court finds that the state has advanced the
regulation in the legitimate goal of health, safety, or general welfare, the Court
is more likely to uphold the regulation.' If the Court finds that the
regulation is focused on providing an economic advantage for the residents of
the state and not the promotion of a legitimate welfare, it will be much more
suspicious of the regulation.' While analyzing the second prong of the test,
which requires a rational relation to the legitimate end, the Court is not likely
to second-guess the judgment of the legislature." All that is required is a
mere rational relationship between the means and ends. These means need not
be the best or the least intrusive measures upon interstate commerce." After
analyzing the first two steps of the procedure, the Court will apply the Pike
Balancing Test to the regulation. The requirements of the test are uncertain and
because of this the court has essentially approached the issue of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in a case by case manner. Accompanying the vagueness of
the test requirements and its case by case application is the ever-present
question of the appropriateness of the Court's balancing issues that are not
essentially legal in nature in order to decide the constitutionality of a state
regulation.
The Court's first charge in analyzing a state regulation is to determine if the
regulation is discriminatory in purpose, means or effect. As previously alluded
to, states have a legitimate interest in regulating for the health and safety
pursuits of its citizens, and does so by way of its state police powers."4 The
Court will not allow a state to construct regulations that are discriminatory in
application to out-of-state interests. To determine the reasonableness of a
statute, the Court will look at the statutory purpose of the regulation.'75 If the
Court determines that the basis of the statute is to shield the state producers
from the effects of the open market of interstate commerce thus providing the
producers an economic advantage, the Court will strike down the
regulation. 76 This theory was formed in a line of cases beginning with the
holding in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc.'" In Baldwin the Court struck down
a state law that prohibited the sale of milk bought out of state at a price lower
than milk from inside the state.' Justice Cardozo writing for the Court held
that the direct and indirect distinction could not be used to justify a state
169. Id.
170. Id. § 6.5, at 409.
171. Id. § 6.5, at 409-10.
172. Id. § 6.5, at 420.
173. Id.
174. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 289.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
178. Id. at 521.
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regulation that was found discriminatory. He states, "Nice distinctions have
been made at times between direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant
when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its necessary tendency
is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the
states."'79 The Court reasoned that one state may not capitalize in its dealings
with another state by placing itself in an isolated position." The Court also
reasoned that one state may not claim individual state social welfare to justify
the discriminatory regulation. The court reasoned that the Constitution was
framed under the idea that we are a nation that will sink or swim together and
that it is as a single nation that we will find prosperity in union not in
division.' To insure that a similar problem as that presented in Baldwin
would not occur again, the Court developed a more strict method of judicial
review. Any regulation that is advanced as a justifiable health and safety
measure will be analyzed to insure that the health and safety measures to be
protected cannot be attained by means that will have lesser restrictive effects
on interstate commerce. Even state regulations formed to serve a legitimate
state interest will still be struck down because of their discriminatory effect.
In the case of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,"' the Court struck down
a state ordinance that prohibited the disposal of out of state waste.' 4 The
issue before the Court was whether New Jersey could refuse to take
Philadelphia's waste.84 The Court held that New Jersey could discontinue all
waste dumping in the state, but that it could not set up a barrier against out of
state waste.'86 The Court reasoned that the state might have a legitimate
reason for regulating commerce, but to tie that regulation to the point of origin
of the commerce was not permissible."7 The Court did not determine the
issue at hand by finding that the statute was discriminatory stating that "the evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."'"
A law that has no evident discrimination against any state may still conflict
with the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Court will look at any regulation,
and if the statute imposes any undue or excessive burden upon commerce, the
Court will view it with skepticism. To determine what constitutes an undue
burden, the Court will perform an ad-hoc balancing test. This ad-hoc balancing
test allows the Court to determine the nature and the purpose of the statute, the
features of the business involved, and the actual result of the law on the current
179. Id at 522.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 523.
182. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 291.
183. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 631.
186. Id. at 627.
187. Id. at 623-24.
188. ld
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of interstate commerce." The Justices sitting on the Court held separate
views on the use of this ad-hoc balancing to invalidate the laws of the state.
Regardless of the Justice's views on the test, the Court was mindful of the
states' interest in regulation by using the police powers. 9 An example of the
Court's treatment of the ad-hoc balancing test is found at Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp.'9 In Kassel the Court struck down a state
regulation that limited freight truck-length." The state claimed that the
regulation was tied to safety.193 The state presented the argument that the
shorter truck is easier to pass, clears intersections with greater ease, and is
easier to back up than others.9 The Court found safety, the state's argument,
to be hollow. Using statistics that showed that the longer trucks were as safe
as the shorter trucks, the Court balanced the purported interest of the state
against the goal of the federal interest of providing unfettered interstate
commerce.95 The Court stated that it appeared that the goal of state
regulation was not safety, but a desire to limit highway usage by diverting
some of the cross-state traffic.9" From the early case to Kassel and to the
present, the Court continues to struggle with its application of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Even through the struggle, it is apparent that the function
and the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause is alive and well. The
Dormant Commerce Clause and its analysis is a method that the Court will
actively use to keep the state from regulating commerce that is essentially in
the scope of Congress's commerce power.
IlL. The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause
The debate of a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause is an argument that has
had little life in the courts. Tribes are exempt from state taxes on economic
activity that takes place on Indian lands. The exemption from state taxation
takes form first from the holding of Worcester v. Georgia"9 which holds that
tribes are sovereign nations that enjoy a exemption from state jurisdiction by
relying on federal preemption.9 The second in the line of the cases in
regards to the exemption of state taxes for the tribes is Williams v. Lee.' In
Williams, the court addressed the issue of what state action is permissible in
189. JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAs DiENES, CONSITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUT SHELL
90 (3d 1995).
190. Id.
191. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
192. Id. at 671.
193. Id. at 671-72.
194. Id. at 672.
195. Id. at 671.
196. Id. at 677.
197. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
198. Id. at 561.
199. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
[Vol. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/12
No. 2] NOTES 373
the absence of governing acts of Congress.' ° The Court developed the test
that states that "absent governing acts of Congress the question is whether the
state action infringes upon the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."'" From these two cases, the sovereignty of the
tribe begins to be viewed as a back drop to preemption anytime the issue of the
state infringing upon the Indian nation is considered. From the preemption
analysis, the test of Williams will be applied to determine if the statute
infringes on the tribes' right to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
History has not been filled with an abundance of case law that pertains to the
issue of states attempting to control tribal lands and to tax tribal activities.
There are numerous theories about why there have been so few attempts in the
past by the state to gain the ability to tax Indian activities. Perhaps, it is
because the history of American tribes is not one that is rich with economic
development or success. Arguably there has been so little economic activity in
the past that there has not been much for the state to tax. Also, the federal
government has held up the unique relationship it shares with the tribes. This
relationship places the tribes as a ward of the federal government and as such
the tribes receive protection from the state's regulation. Recently however, the
tribe's tax exemption has been stretched by a series of Court opinions centering
around the sale of cigarettes on tribal lands. In an effort to gain economic
stability and growth, some of the tribes in America began selling cigarettes
from smoke shops located in Indian territory. The tribes were attempting to
take advantage of the state tax exemption, which provided a cheaper product
free from state tax that was in demand from tribal members and nontribal
members.
Some would argue that the discussion of the Dormant Indian Commerce
Clause was snuffed out just as it was beginning to grow legs as a possible
argument against state taxation. In the case of Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,' then Justice Rehnquist placed
language in a footnote that was arguably a lock on the door to a Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause action. In Moe, a tribe and some of its members
appealed a district court decision.' The tribe and its members sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the state's cigarette tax as it applied to
tribal members who sold cigarettes within the reservation.' In Moe a
member of the tribe leased land and operated a smoke shop where he sold tax-
exempt cigarettes."5 The Deputy Sheriffs office arrested the owner of the
shop for failure to collect the state tax on cigarettes that were sold to nontribal
200. Id. at 218.
201. Id. at 219.
202. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
203. Id. at 465-66.
204. Id.
205. Id at 467.
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members who had come onto the reservation to purchase the cigarettes.2
The district court held that the state's effort to tax the tribes was not possible
with one exception.' The district court declared that a state could require a
precollection of the tax upon the purchases of nonmembers who traveled onto
the reservation to purchase cigarettes.' On appeal, the district court's
decision concerning the state's ability to tax the activities of tribes and tribal
members was before the Court. Addressing the question of the state's ability
to tax an Indian or the tribe for activity that takes place on reservation land, the
Court relied on established case law to form its holding. The Court held that
the state has no authority to tax the tribe absent of congressional consent.
The Court summarized important language from the holding of Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones21° which states,
In the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction
or other federal statutes permitting it, there had been no
satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian
income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation, . . . and that any such taxation is not permissible
absent congressional consent. 1'
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court then under the backdrop of
procedural clarification, provided a footnote in the opinion that arguably trumps
a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause. 12 Note 17 states,
It is thus clear that the basis for the invalidity of these taxing
measures, which we have found to be inconsistent with existing
federal statutes, is the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitution., Art.
VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic exemptions 'as a matter of
constitutional law' either under the Commerce Clause or the
intergovernmental-immunity doctrine as laid down originally in
McCulloch v. Maryland.2 '3
The footnote was advanced as an explanation of a procedural issue that
arose in the case, but the effect of the footnote was a virtual quashing of a
future Dormant Indian Commerce Clause argument. The procedural question
pertained to the properness of convening a three-judge court in the attack of the
state statute by way of the Commerce Clause and not the Supremacy
206. Id.
207. Id. at 468.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 476.
210. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
211. Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-76.
212. Id. at 481.
213. Id.
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Clause."4 Following the footnote, Justice Rehnquist directly addressed the
issue of whether the state had the power to require an Indian retailer to collect
the state tax on cigarettes sold on the reservation to nontribal members.2 "
The Court refers to the district court's finding that it was the non-Indian
consumer that was saving the tax and reaping the benefit of the tax
exemption.2 " The appellants argued that the tax required the collector to
become an involuntary agent of the state, and that the tax was a gross
interference with the freedom from state regulation.2 7 The Court held that the
state could require the Indian retailer to add the tax to the sale price and
therefore aid in the state's collection of the tax.!" The Court reasoned that the
collection of the tax was at most a minimal burden upon the seller, and that
this burden was overcome by the help the retailer was providing in collecting
a valid tax.2 9 The Court also buttressed its decision by declaring that the
burden was not strictly a tax at all. This distinction allowed it to slide past the
strict language previously stated in Mescalero.m Finding nothing that limited
the right of the tribe to be self-governed or any federal legislation violated by
the tax, the Court found the state statute valid. Although they were
provided with an insightful amicus brief for the appellees explaining the
imposition of the tax from the tribe's view the Court came to its conclusion that
the state could impose the general excise tax on the tribe. The amicus brief for
the appellees posed the argument that the enforcement of the state tax law
violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.m Moreover, the
Commerce Clause gave the federal government the authority to regulate Indian
commerce.'m In the brief, the method of the tax plan and its problems are
expressed in relation to their effects on the tribal retailer. The state tax plan
required the Indian retailer to purchase cigarettes for resale and affix a state tax
stamp to the cigarettes that would be sold to nonmembers who purchased the
items on the reservation.m The Indian retailer then would be responsible for
recovering the value of the tax by adding the difference to the price of the
cigarettes sold to the nonmember purchaser.' The result of the tax plan was
to place the purchaser at a disadvantage by requiring him to prepay the tax and
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. id. at 482.
218. d. at 483.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Brief for the Appellees at 10, Moe (No. 75-50).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 23.
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then run the risk of not recovering the cost. The brief states that the tribal
member was taxed; he suffered an out of pocket loss by being forced to prepay
the state for the tax.'n The brief claims that the retailer was forced into the
role of involuntary tax agent that has in a sense provided the state an interest
free loan that has no guarantee of recovery.' Lastly, the brief points out that
if the tribes attempt to impose a legitimate tribal tax coupled with the state tax
it would greatly disadvantage the tribe's attempts to generate needed
revenue. 9 Viewed in this manner, the brief claims that the state tax is a
substantial burden upon tribal self-government.'
The Court's decision in Moe, note 17 specifically, disadvantaged any
possible Dormant Indian Commerce Clause argument. The issue has come
before the Court since Moe and the Court has specifically scrutinized the
footnote. Addressing the issue of state taxation of cigarettes sold on reservation
to nonmembers, the Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation , commenting on note 17, discredits its sweeping
authority." The Court cites case law holding that prior Court decisions will
not be found conclusive to discredit current constitutional claims unless the
claims are proven frivolous. 3 Though the Court did not discredit the
possibility of a Commerce Clause claim as Moe had, it addressed the issue
only by applying the Williams v. Lee T standard. The Court held that the tax
did not interfere with the tribe's ability to make their own laws and to be ruled
by them, and subsequently found the tax valid. " The case is important
because it indicated that the Court may not be willing to follow the lead of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and ban all Commerce Clause arguments by
the tribes.
A 1996 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act case arguably made the Dormant
Commerce Clause question ripe for the Court's review once more. Seminole
Tribe v. Florida" was a case before the Court that dealt with the question
of Congress's power to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in
attempting to compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
In arguing the issue before the Court, the parties disagreed over the power of
the federal government under the Commerce Clause as opposed to the Indian
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id
229. Id.
230. Id. at 24.
231. 447 U.S. 134, 147 (1980).
232. Id
233. Id. at 147-48.
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235. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 156.
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Commerce Clause. " Addressing the conflict, the Court limited the question
to whether the Indian Commerce Clause like the Commerce Clause is a grant
of authority to the federal government at the expense of the stateY8 The
Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause created a greater transfer of
power to the federal government than that of the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 9 The Court reasoned that the Indian Commerce Clause virtually
transferred all power to the federal government in the area of Indian
commerce.' The Court distinguished this near absolute control of power
over Indian commerce by the federal government as opposed to that of
Interstate commerce power over which the state retained a degree of
authority."'
Though the principal issue before the Court in the case was not directly on
point with the question of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the case provided
valuable insight on the issue. The Court's determination that the Indian
commerce power was more closely tied to the federal government than the
Interstate commerce power opens the door to a Dormant Indian Commerce
Clause question. As had been shown previously, it is not disputable that the
scope of the Interstate commerce clause is broad enough to include Dormant
Commerce Clause violations. If the determination that the scope of the federal
government's power is near absolute in the area of Indian commerce is sound
then reason would provide that a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause power
would be included under such a sweeping authority.
If the Court follows the precedent of the explanation of the federal
government's power in the area of Indian commerce, an argument for the
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause seems reasonable. If the Court were to
accept the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause argument, state tax imposed on
the tribe for any reason would be subject to a more strict review. A state tax
on any Indian commerce sold on the reservation regardless of the purchaser's
classification would be subject to the same scrutiny that Dormant Commerce
Clause violations receive. Currently the Court will review the state statute and
determine if it runs counter to any federal legislation. If not it will then
determine if it interferes with the tribes' right to make their own laws and to
be ruled by them. If the Court finds the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause
persuasive, the existing test will precede the Pike Balancing Test that applies
to Dormant Commerce Clause violations. A possible reading of the test would
be as follows: A state regulation that affects Indian commerce must meet each
of the following regulations to be valid.
(1) The regulation must pursue a legitimate state end;
237. Id. at 60.
238. Id. at 62.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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(2) The regulation must be rationally related to that legitimate end; and
(3) The regulatory burden imposed by the state on Indian Commerce, and
any discrimination against Indian commerce, must be outweighed by the state's
interest in enforcing its regulation.
Following the balancing test of the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, the
statute would then be judged against the traditional Williams v. Lee standard
of review, which will not allow any regulation that interferes with the tribes'
ability to make their own laws and to be ruled by them.
The outcome of cases that have dealt with the imposition of a state tax law
upon the tribes under a Dormant Commerce Clause could be subject to turning
in the direction of the tribes. To provide a example of the possible varying
outcomes of these types of cases should properly begin with the application of
the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause to Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation.' " Application of the new
standard of review to the case that was once arguably the death nail of the
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause would strengthen the tribe's argument to an
unknown extent. If the holding of Moe is affected by the new standard of
review for state regulation of Indian commerce, then the whole landscape of
state regulation on Indian land is susceptible to a more strict review. On the
other hand, if the holding in Moe is not affected by the new review, the
argument that the standard should be reviewed by the Court in a case with a
similar state regulation remains valid after the Seminole case. Applying the
new standard of review of the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause to the Moe
case, the legitimate state end must be found in the state's advancement of the
regulation. The state claimed that the tax was simply a direct tax on the retail
customer and that the proposed outcome is convenience and facility in
collecting the tax. 3 With convenience and facility as the legitimate result,
the Court then must look to see if the regulation is rationally related to that
end. Analyzing this second step in the test, the Court found that the regulation
requires the Indian retailer to collect the tax for the state, which would provide
for convenience and facilitate tax collection. The regulation is rationally related
to providing convenience and facilitating tax collection. Finally, the Court must
determine the regulatory burden or discrimination against Indian commerce
imposed by the regulation and weigh it against the state's interest. To make
this determination, the Court must review the regulation as it would affect the
Indian retailer as opposed to the state's interest of convenient tax collection. In
order to collect the tax, the state's regulation required an Indian retailer to
collect the tax from the nonmember purchaser when selling the cigarettes on
the reservation.2 The amicus brief for the appellees explains that the retailer
must pay an out-of-pocket expense by prepaying for the state tax when he
242. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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378 [Vol. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/12
purchases his cigarettes from the wholesaler, and then must collect the
difference at resale. 5 The brief points out that the regulation makes the
Indian retailer a forced tax collector.' The state by requiring a form of
interest free nonguaranteed loan from the Indian retailer is actually requiring
the Indian retailer to collect the state's tax if he hopes to make his money back.
Burdens placed on the flow of Indian commerce will increase by requiring the
Indian retailer to prove tribal membership of cigarette purchasers. Because of
this, the Indian retailer is required to demand background identification from
every single cigarette purchaser. Since the tax is only applicable to
nonmembers, the Indian retailer cannot afford to miss one sale to a
nonmember. In fact, there is no incentive to patronize tribal members since the
transaction does not help get his required payment back from the state. In
addition, during all cigarette transactions Indian retailers must diligently police
the activities of the work staff since they do not have a personal stake in
recouping the prepaid loan. The discrimination against Indian commerce is
obvious. The regulation does not require the state to do anything toward in the
collection of its own tax. The state is required to pay its tax collection and
processing agents for any work that they provide, but this regulation requires
the Indian retailer to do the state's work for free. In addition, by requiring a
prepayment of the tax by the Indian retailer, the state is guaranteed a 100
percent tax return. The Indian retailer however carries the complete burden of
collection and has no guarantee that the pretaxed cigarettes will be purchased.
The possibility of nonmarketability for the cigarettes is endless in addition to
the fact that the store may be the subject of a burglary or be destroyed. The
state carries no risk under this regulation yet it reaps all the benefit. The state
has a valid interest in facilitating the convenient collection of its tax, but it is
hard to think that the state's need for convenience is to be borne completely by
the Indian retailer. The new standard of review will make the state struggle to
overcome the burden and discrimination of the regulation in forwarding its
interest. Lastly, the state is not without recourse in the area of a valid state tax
applied to purchases of non-Indians on the reservation. The state has the ability
and the right to go to Congress in search for a method of collecting state tax
for transactions taking place on the reservation.
The Court's language in the Seminole case makes the issue of a Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause ripe for the Court's review once more. A Dormant
Indian Commerce Clause would provide the federal government the ability to
arm itself with a new and more rigorous standard of review to protect the
Indians from state incursions while exercising its fiduciary responsibility with
the tribes. The theory of the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause is not one that
would keep the state from collecting a valid tax. The states have the
opportunity to go to the Congress and request the tax revenue that it may be
245. Brief for Appellees at 23, Moe (No. 75-50).
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loosing on reservation sales, but the state should not have the ability to require
the tribe to act as an uncompensated tax agent in collecting revenue for the
state. Economic stability is the key to the tribes' success in securing a
promising future for its members and for its heritage. Allowing the state to
apply its taxing powers onto tribal land for any reason is akin to permitting the
first small crack to form in the wall that the federal government is to provide
in separating the state and the tribes.
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